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Abstract
The paper presents a model of ﬁscal and monetary policy that evaluates the tradeoff be­
tweenhigher distortionarylabortaxationand higherinationintheresolutionofﬁscal crises.
In the model government debt is domestically held and nominal. Data are presented to show
that such debt is now at least as important as external government debt in many key emerg­
ing markets, and that it is a very important item on the balance sheets of domestic ﬁnancial
intermediaries, despite the disappearance of ﬁnancial repression. In the model government
debt correspondingly enters the economy’s intermediation technology. The key contribution
of this mechanism is that it makes unanticipated ination costly. This permits a general­
ization of existing ﬁscal theories of the price level by making price level determination the
outcome of an explicit government optimization problem over a tax distortion and an in­
ation distortion. Higher taxes have a distortionary effect on labor supply but a beneﬁcial
effect by lowering ination and supporting a higher public debt stock that in turn supports
intermediation and the capital stock.
In such a model ﬁrst period price level jumps generally do not contribute to the resolution
of ﬁscal crises. Instead ongoing but modest ina t i o ni su s e dt ol e v ys e i g n i o r a g eo nd e b t .
This gives rise to a ﬁscal theory of ination whose transmission mechanism does not rely on
base money seigniorage. It is found that a large contribution of ina t i o nt ot h er e s o l u t i o no f
a ﬁscal crisis is only optimal when the ﬁscal shock is transitory, while a long­lived shock is
optimally ﬁnanced mostly through taxes.
The author thanks Guillermo Calvo, Bob Hall, Ken Judd, Enrique Mendoza, Evan Tanner,
Mark Wright and seminar participants at UC Santa Cruz and Stanford for helpful comments.
Major parts of this research were completed while the author visited the Hong Kong Institute
for Monetary Research, the Research Departments of the IMF and the IDB, and the IMF
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11 Introduction
This paper analyzes the trade­offs arising in the optimal choice of a ﬁscal and monetary
policy response to serious ﬁscal imbalances, an issue that has been at the heart of several
recent emerging markets crises. In the model ﬁscal crises arise through exogenous real
transfer spending shocks. Debt is nominal, labor taxation is distortionary, and crises can
be resolved either through an increase in distortionary taxation or through higher ination.
The key innovation is that unanticipated ination is distortionary, due to its effect on the
intermediation technology of the economy.
This research was motivated by a number of International Monetary Fund (IMF) ﬁscal
adjustment programs in emerging markets. The paper suggests a model to characterize the
optimal design of such programs, subject to constraints that are typically encountered in
practice. The maintained assumption is that the government is able to fully commit to the
optimal program, and that the program is completely successful in restoring both solvency
and credibility.
At its most basic level, the evaluation of a country’s ﬁscal solvency requirements often
does not go beyond mechanical manipulations of the government budget constraint as an
accounting identity. In such an exercise one imputes values for the expected primary budget
surplus, seigniorage revenue, the real GDP growth rate and the real interest rate. If they do
not put total real government debt on a stable path, one computes the required adjustments
in government spending or taxes. An example of this type of analysis is Blanchard et al.
(1990). A critical underlying assumption is that debt is both real and non­defaultable. This
means that outright default on real or nominal debt is not allowed to make a contribution
to crisis resolution. Similarly, monetary policy and changes in the price level are only
allowed to contribute to restoring ﬁscal solvency through higher seigniorage on base money,
2as in Sargent and Wallace (1981), not through a change in the real value of a nominal debt
stock. However, many emerging markets’ ﬁscal crises point to the limits of this approach.
Prolonged political resistance to tax increases and/or spending cuts have often led to an over­
accumulation of debt that could ultimately only be resolved through a partial default, or in
the case of nominal debt through a large jump in the price level, referred to here as a debt
devaluation.
When discussing such debt devaluations as part of a ﬁscal adjustment program in an
open economy, economists and policymakers generally focus on total public debt while
turningtothesovereigndebtliteratureforguidance. However, asemphasizedinanimportant
paper by Reinhart et al. (2003) which is discussed further in Section 2, domestically issued
government debt has become an increasingly important source of ﬁnancing for emerging
market governments, representing close to or more than half of total public debt. In almost
all cases most of this debt is denominated in domestic currency.
1 And most importantly, it is
t y p i c a l l yh e l db yd o m e s t i cr e s i d ents. Judging such debt by the criteria of the sovereign debt
literature overlooks that the relevant economic criteria are very different. And given its share
in total public debt, this omission is not trivial.
Inthesovereigndebt literature
2 themainbeneﬁtofadebtdefaultordebtdevaluationisthe
resource transfer from foreign creditors, with a secondary beneﬁt of lower distortions from
the taxation required to service the debt. Because of the former, sovereign creditors have to
be able to credibly threaten the debtor with exclusion from future borrowing. Contracts are
then designed to ensure that default never occurs in equilibrium. This feature is problematic
when thinking about actual ﬁscal crises, which are frequently resolved in part through a
debt devaluation. The tension arises because in this literature the debt to GDP ratios that
1 In some cases this domestic currency debt is indexed to some other market variable. It
is typically of short maturity.
2 See Eaton and Fernandez (1995) for a survey of the earlier literature. Recent contributions
have stressed repeated game aspects, and include Cole and Kehoe (1998) and Wright (2002).
This literature exclusively considers real debt.
3can be sustained in equilibrium are counterfactually low.
3 The reason is that the cost to
the debtor of the set of feasible punishments tends to be low relative to the large beneﬁto f
defaulting. This paper claims that that calculus is reversed for domestically held debt. The
main argument, motivated both empirically and theoretically below, is that devaluations of
domestic debt have high economic costs through their effect on ﬁnancial intermediation. It
is true that the beneﬁts are also much smaller because there is no resource transfer, domestic
debtholderseffectivelyowingthepublicdebttothemselves. Butthisbyitselfisnotsufﬁcient
to discourage a debt devaluation in response to a ﬁscal shock, because if it is credibly a one­
off event that restores solvency while not imposing any other economic costs, it remains
preferable to higher distortionary taxation. This is indeed the conventional result in the
literature on domestic debt,w h i c hﬁnds that debt is optimally the main shock absorber for
spendingshocks. But thisisevidently not how policymakers behave, debt devaluations being
as ﬁercely resisted as tax hikes when there is a serious ﬁscal crisis. What is needed therefore
is a theory that makes the real value of public debt dependent on ﬁscal policy while reecting
and making sense of the concern of policymakers with the costs of debt devaluations.
The earliest theory linking ﬁscal policy to the determination of the real debt value through
price level jumps is the ﬁscal theory of the price level. It assumes that the price level
equalizes the real value of nominal public debt and the present discounted value of primary
surpluses.
4 The key characteristic of this theory is that primary ﬁscal surpluses are assumed
to be exogenous, while in traditional monetary theories they are endogenous to monetary
policy. If the nominal debt stock is large enough relative to the size of the shock, debt
can then act as the sole shock absorber for ﬁscal shocks. Importantly, this function of debt
does not create any distortions, it acts as a capital levy. This theory has been challenged
on both empirical and theoretical grounds. Empirically, for the US case, Canzoneri et al.
3 Arellano and Heathcote (2003) obtain sustainable debt to GDP ratios of only around 1%
to 3%, depending on the monetary regime.
4 Key contributions to this literature are Cochrane (1998), Sims (1994) and Woodford (1996, 1998, 2001).
A long list of additional references is contained in Cochrane (1998, 2000) and Woodford (2001).
4(2004) ﬁnd strong evidence against the ﬁscal and in favor of monetary theories of price level
determination. This is plausible, because the US has a strong and exible tax base. But in
emerging markets’ ﬁscal and debt crises, to the extent that they involve nominal debt, the
ﬁscal dimension of price level determination becomes much more obvious. These countries
typically have a narrow and weak tax base that cannot exibly respond to ﬁscal solvency
needs
5, and in addition IMF negotiations typically contend with strong political opposition
to tax increases. Fiscal dominance over monetary policy is therefore a serious problem, and
the resolution of such ﬁscal crises almost always involves a large jump in the price level, as
a result of an exchange rate devaluation.
The theoretical critique of the ﬁscal theory of the price level concerns the nature of
the government’s intertemporal budget constraint.
6 But a more general critique deserves
emphasis. Thisisthatneithertheassumptionofcompletelyexogenousnorthatofcompletely
endogenous primary surpluses is based on a theory of optimal government choice.
7
Theoptimalﬁscalpolicyliterature(ChariandKehoe(1999)), whichassumesdistortionary
taxation, islessvulnerableto thislattercritique. But, becauseunanticipatedpriceleveljumps
are again non­distortionary, the model continues to heavily favor ination over taxation
in response to ﬁscal spending shocks.
8 In fact, the government is now faced with a time
inconsistency problem, because it has an incentive to inate away the entire debt stock
in its initial planning period. The literature deals with this problem in one of two ways.
The ﬁrst (Calvo and Guidotti (1993), Chari and Kehoe (1999)) is to assume that the ﬁrst
period price level is arbitrarily ﬁxed while the policymaker can commit to future policies.
However, ruling out changes in the initial price level is a very strong assumption when
thinking about the resolution of a serious ﬁscal crisis. At such moments governments have
5 See Gavin and Perrotti (1997) for detailed evidence for Latin America.
6 See e.g. Buiter (1998, 1999) on the one hand, and Woodford (2001) on the other. Bassetto
(2002) clariﬁes this debate.
7 The same is also true for the literature on ﬁscal reaction rules, see e.g. Johnson (2003).
8 Chari and Kehoe (1999) ﬁnd that 70%­80% of spending shocks is optimally absorbed by
the price level, because varying the real return on bonds has a very low cost.
5to choose between a number of painful options, and there is no reason why a measure that
reduces the real debt burden would not be o n eo ft h e m . T h es a m es h o u l db et r u ef o rt h e
model. The second way of dealing with time inconsistency is to model the cost of debt
devaluation as a loss of the policymaker’s credibility which forces the economy to settle on
an inferior equilibrium in subsequent periods. The policymaker then has to trade off this cost
against the one­off beneﬁto fa ni n ationary surprise. But for an emerging economy faced
with a serious ﬁscal imbalance, this way of modeling the policymaker’s decision problem
has its own problems. First, and this is a general problem in this literature, the choice of
the inferior equilibrium following an inationary surprise is somewhat arbitrary. Second,
w h e nt h ep u b l i ci sf u l l ya w a r eo ft h eﬁscal problems because of their severity, it is not
clear that delaying a debt devaluation should have a positive effect on the credibility of the
policymaker. Third, especially for the large debt devaluations required to restore solvency
in emerging markets ﬁscal crises, there is a much more obvious and immediate cost to the
government. This is that the inationary erosion of the public debt stock can have severe
effects on the health of already fragile ﬁnancial systems, who tend to hold large amounts of
such debt.
9 This has for example been a key consideration in the recent Argentinian crisis,
but that is only the most extreme example of many. Further evidence on this point will be
provided in Section 2.
This suggests a crucial new model ingredient ­ costly unanticipated ination. Its
implication is that the trade­off between taxation and ination as a ﬁscal shock absorber
need no longer be heavily biased in favor of ination.
10 Costly unanticipated ination is
a feature of the model in Section 3 due to a ﬁnancial constraint that makes the stock of
intermediated capital dependent on the stock of government debt. Under this assumption it
9 Of course the paper does not suggest that credibility considerations should be disregarded. They
should in fact be seen as complementary to the approach proposed here, and are probably
more important for industrialized countries.
10 Calvo (1988), in a very insightful paper, obtains such a tradeoff by assuming an ad hoc cost function for
unanticipated ination. Calvo and Guidotti (1993) and Chari and Kehoe (1999) stress the
importance of improving the understanding of the microfoundations of costly unanticipated ination.
6becomes possible to combine the main advantages of the ﬁscal theory of the price level and
of the optimal ﬁscal policy literature. As in the former, a ﬁnite ﬁrst period price level can
be determined. And as in the latter, price level determination is the outcome of an explicit
government optimization problem. Higher taxation is distortionary, but it also allows the
government to service a higher debt stock that in turn lowers ination and supports a higher
capital stock.
IMF negotiations with countries in ﬁscal difﬁculties typically take it as given that changes
in taxation must be front­loaded and that thereafter the primary balance should be kept
constant relative to output. This is documented in Chalk and Hemming (2000). There
are several reasons to rule out highly variable paths of labor tax rates. Most importantly,
the political costs would be prohibitive because of the implied large redistributions between
holdersofﬁnancialassetsandworkers. Also, suchpolicieswouldencouragetaxevasion, and
their implementation would have high resource costs in countries where tax administration
is already weak and inefﬁcient. Ruling out such tax paths is therefore a much more plausible
assumption than restricting the initial price level. The paper incorporates this constraint
by assuming that the government is only allowed to choose one,c o n s t a n tt a xr a t eτopt for
any given sequence of government spending {gt}
∞
t=0. It is shown that under this restriction
there is a unique tax rate at which there is no incentive for time inconsistent government
behavior. But at the same time that tax rate is too low in terms of steady state welfare
because the ﬁnancial constraint binds and long run capital taxation (via the ination tax on
debt) is nonzero. In other words, both the labor tax distortion and the ination tax distortion
are present at that optimum.
Under these assumptions the model explores, by way of a computed example, the optimal
ﬁscal response to exogenous transfer spending shocks. The model has several novel and
interesting implications. First, for the most plausible choice of initial conditions the initial
price level does not contribute at all to the restoration of ﬁscal solvency. Instead the shock
absorber role of debt works through higher ination, in other words through seigniorage on
7debt. Given the size of the debt stock, the required increase in ination is not very large even
for a substantial spending shock. As for the burden­sharing between taxation and ination
in the computed examples, permanent spending shocks call for around three quarters of the
increase to be optimally ﬁnanced through higher taxes. More transitory shocks call for a
larger contribution of ination.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses empirical evidence
from emerging markets on the relative importance of domestic versus external public debt,
and on the importance of that debt in domestic ﬁnancial systems. The section concludes
by motivating the theoretical modeling of government debt. The theoretical model is
presented in Section 3. Section 4 discusses some computed examples of optimal policy
responses to ﬁscal shocks. Section 5 concludes. The Appendix contains some preliminary
results discussed in Section 4. A separate Technical Appendix
11 contains details of the
computational methods used to compute the solutions in Section 4.
2 Government Debt in Emerging Financial Markets
Table 1 shows that for several of the most important emerging markets domestic
government debt represents close to or more than half of total government debt.
12
Furthermore, in almost all cases (Argentina being the main exception) the majority of this
debt is denominated in domestic currency. It is quite clear that this debt class deserves as
much or more attention than sovereign debt.
Reinhart et al. (2003) make several additional points that will be ree c t e di nt h e
assumptions of the model. First, for many of the countries listed in Table 1 the cause of high
domestic debt stocks has been the recapitalization of an insolvent domestic banking system
11 This is available from the author on request.
12 The table is reproduced from Reinhart et al. (2003). We thank Carmen Reinhart for her
permission to use the data. Batlay and del Valle (2002) present very similar evidence for
a large number of Eastern European and Central Asian countries. In that region domestic
currency denominated domestic debt is even more prevalent than in the countries in Table 1.
8following a crisis. In the model, government spending shocks are pure transfers. Second,
in many emerging markets bank holdings of government debt are no longer primarily due
to government ﬁnancial repression. Recent increases in emerging market debt ﬁnancing
costs are precisely due to a switch from forced borrowing at low interest rates to borrowing
through marketable debt at market­based interest rates.
13 In the model, agents choose to hold
government debt mainly to satisfy a ﬁnancial constraint that is due to imperfections in private
ﬁnancial markets.
Table 1: Domestically­Issued versus Externally­Issued Government Debt∗
Country Domestic External Domestic Debt/ Dom. Ccy. Debt/
Debt/GDP Debt/GDP Total Debt Total Dom. Debt
Argentina 15.4 36.4 30 18
Brazil 35.8 18.5 66 80
Chile 27.3 8.8 76 92
Colombia 12.4 24.5 34 93
India 64.9 20.6 76 100
Korea 41.6 21.1 66 100
Malaysia 35.1 30.7 53 98
Mexico 9.5 26.8 26 100
Philippines 43.0 48.8 47 100
Thailand 34.6 41.5 45 100
Turkey 24.4 36.5 40 78
Venezuela 7.4 32.6 19 100
∗ Average for 1996­2000, except for domestic debt to GDP ratio in Korea (1997­2000).
Figure 1 presents data on public debt held by domestic banking systems in a large number
of emerging (and, for comparison, industrialized) economies.
14
13 Caprio (1999) also discusses evidence to this effect.
14 The percentage ﬁgures are computed from International Financial Statistics, and are averages
for 1998­2002. The numerator is the sum of all entries representing net credit to the public
sectorbydepositmoneybanks, otherbankinginstitutionsandnonbankﬁnancialinstitutions(thelatterseries
do not exist for all countries). The denominator is the sum of the net total assets of these three groups,
after cancelling out credit items between them. To obtain the net ﬁgures we deduct from both numerator and
denominator the sum of all entries representing credit by the public sector to these institutions.
Crisis years are excluded from the computation of averages as follows: Argentina 2002, Indonesia 1998.
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It is worth remembering that the typical bank capitalization ratio is less than 10% of
assets, so that extending credit to the public sector on the order of magnitude shown exposes
banks to a very high insolvency risk if the public sector runs into serious difﬁculties. This is
10indeed exactly what happened in Argentina.
15 Perry and Serven (2002) conclude that “...the
roots of the [Argentinian] crisis lie in the ... rigid exchange rate regime, the fragile ﬁscal
position, and the hidden vulnerability of the banking system behind its strong facade...”.
During the protracted negotiations that eventually led to Argentina’s massive default, it was a
key consideration that a large government default would seriously harm the banking system.
But Argentina is only the most extreme of many such cases in emerging markets. Existing
models fail to capture this concern.
The theoretical model of this paper does introduce a link between the real stock of
government debt and ﬁnancial intermediation, and in turn between ﬁnancial intermediation
and production. It does so through a ﬁnancial constraint whereby the capital stock has to
be intermediated and a certain fraction of the associated borrowing has to be collateralized
through government debt. This improves the intermediation technology by providing a
means to overcome moral hazard.
Fry (1997) contains an excellent survey of several other important beneﬁts of domestic
public debt in emerging markets. One is that government debt serves as an informational
benchmark and as such is useful for the development of private capital markets. Reinhart et
al. (2000), in discussing the disappearance of US government debt in the late 1990s, suggest
that this liquidity function of government debt can in the US be quite easily replaced by
high quality private sector ﬁnancial assets. But the same is not true for emerging markets,
precisely because there the historic lack of developed public debt markets has been an
impediment to the growth of private capital markets. Reinhart et al. (2000) add that if it
is the safety rather than the liquidity of government debt which investors value, the scope
for market innovation to ﬁll that gap may be much more limited. And indeed the riskiness
of banks in emerging markets is generally held to be lower when they hold a relatively large
proportion of their assets in the form of government debt. This is recognized by the Basle
15 Although in that case contrary to our formal model public debt was largely denominated
in US dollars and only converted to local currency as part of the eventual default.
11rules for capital adequacy which give a much lower risk weighting to such debt, even if the
debtor is an emerging market government. Many of these beneﬁts of public debt, and others
elaborated in the theoretical literature such as by Holmström and Tirole (1998), could be
introduced into a macroeconomic model through a reduced form production function that
directly contains government debt as an argument. But this turns out to be unnecessary
when the ﬁnancial constraint proposed in this paper is imposed, because the solution to that
model is functionally equivalent to a model with bonds in the production function. This
makes the model a close relative of several existing modeling traditions. Several authors
have studied models with money in the production function, e.g. Mulligan (1997), Calvo
(1979) and Benhabib et al. (2001). There is also a long tradition of research exploring
the role of bonds in the utility function, including Friedman (1969), Barro (1974), Fried
and Howitt (1983), Poterba and Rotemberg (1987), and Bansal and Coleman (1996). The
ﬁnancial constraint used in this paper builds on the recent literature on ﬁnancial market
imperfections, especially Kiyotaki and Moore’s (1997) collateral constraint. When applied
to government debt, that story has three essential ingredients. First, inter­company credit
transactions are a pervasive feature of physical capital allocation in real economies. Second,
many of these credit relationships involve moral hazard on the part of users of capital. Third,
when legal systems, government regulations and market mechanisms are incomplete so that
real assets are difﬁcult to pledge as collateral, government debt can serve as an effective
alternative.
In any economy the vast majority of capital is intermediated. Inter­company credit in the
form of loans or trade credit forms a very large part of a typical company’s balance sheet.
For tractability and to facilitate welfare analysis the paper captures this not by modeling
savers and users of capital as separate agents, but instead by a device similar to the Lucas
and Stokey (1983, 1987) cash­in­advance model, as shown in Figure 2. The representative
household consists of a consumer, a worker, a saver and a producer who pool resources
during the opening of a securities markets at the end of each period and then split at the
12beginning of the next period when goods and factor markets open. The crucial aspect of this
is that the saver and the producer are separate parties while production takes place. They
therefore require an intermediary, and the intermediary requires collateral.
The reason is moral hazard, because once capital is handed over to the producer, its
inside value exceeds the outside value to the intermediary, giving the producer an incentive
to default. This is the problem considered by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), who explore
the implications under two further assumptions. One is that any loan required to ﬁnance
capital holdings needs to be fully covered by collateral. The other is that capital itself
can serve as collateral. The model in the next section retains the ﬁrst assumption, but it
weakens the second. It is assumed that all capital must be intermediated
16,b u tt h a tt h eu s eo f
capital itself as collateral is subject to limitations. The motivation is that emerging ﬁnancial
markets generally have weak legal systems, weak or unenforced government regulations,
and underdeveloped market mechanisms to alleviate informational asymmetries. This is
documented extensively by de Soto (2000) and Pagano (2001). Under such conditions
government debt represents a very attractive alternative. Government debt is ultimately
also backed by (taxes on) private income, but this derives from the pooled income of all
agents, and is certiﬁed and securitized by the government, thereby removing moral hazard.
In addition government debt is technically easier to pledge than physical capital, and there
is generally a liquid secondary market with a reasonably certain resale value. Several large
emerging markets now also have active repo markets.
T h ep r e s e n c eo faﬁnancial constraint linking government debt and the capital stock
generates a ﬁscal policy trade­off between distortionary labor taxation and distortionary
ination. This is illustrated in Figure 3, which shows household indifference curves and
production possibilities frontiers between consumption and leisure. Labor taxation has two
effects that work in opposite directions. It generates a wedge between the marginal rates
16 This assumption can be made as weak as desired by assigning a low value for the required
collateral coverage ratio in the model, because uncollateralized borrowing behaves like direct ownership.
13of substitution and transformation between consumption and leisure, thereby reducing labor
input for any given capital stock. But it also allows the government to service a larger stock
of government debt and thereby to support more ﬁnancial intermediation and a larger capital
stock. The ﬁrst effect means that a suboptimal allocation is chosen along a given production
possibilities frontier, but the second effect shifts the production possibilities frontier itself
outwards. At point A taxes are low and the labor supply distortion is moderate. But the
ﬁnancial constraint is tightly binding. A higher tax rate such as at B further worsens the
former distortion, but it improves the latter. Beyond a certain maximum level of tax and
debt, further debt no longer relaxes the constraint. The associated production possibilities
frontier and allocation are shown in Figure 3 as PPF III and point C. The ﬁrst­best at Z is
unattainable because taxes are distortionary. This static analysis suggests that taxes should
be raised all the way to the point where the ﬁnancial constraint no longer binds. However,
as will be shown below, dynamic considerations imply that the government can improve
w e l f a r eb ym o v i n ga w a yf r o mCt oal o w e rt a xr a t ea n dt h e r e f o r eal o w e rc a p i t a ls t o c k .T h i s
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Figure 3: Trade­Off Between Frictions
143T h e M o d e l
Theeconomyconsistsofarepresentativehousehold, anintermediaryandthegovernment.
Output is homogenous and prices are exible. The economy is closed to simplify the
exposition. Introducing the possibility of holding international bonds would not qualitatively
alter the results as long as these bonds are imperfect substitutes for domestic bonds in
the intermediation technology.
17 The government sets two policy instruments, the nominal
interest rate (monetary policy) and the labor tax rate (ﬁscal policy). Government transfer
spending shocks are assumed to be exogenous and uninsurable.
3.1 Households
Households derive utility from consumption ct,l e i s u r e1 − lt, and real money balances
Mt+1/Pt,w h e r ePt is the price level. Their rate of time preference is r, and the time unit is














The utility index v(.) for real money balances is assumed to have a satiation point m∗ at
which v0(m∗)=0 . Households can also acquire nominal government discount bonds Dt+1
at the price Dt+1/(1 + i
g
t+1),w h e r ei
g
t+1 is the policy determined nominal interest rate. Real
bonds equal dt = Dt/Pt, and the real interest rate is denoted by r
g
t. Capital accumulation is
given by
kt+1 =( 1− δ)kt + It , (2)
where δ is the rate of depreciation and It is investment, which is subject to a quadratic
adjustment cost of the form (
ξ
2)(It
kt − δ)2. The producer’s technology is Cobb­Douglas in
17 Thisisgenerallythecase, foranumberofreasons: First, internationalbondsaresubjecttodifferentlegal
jurisdictions and therefore less suitable as collateral for local transactions. Second, holdings
by ﬁnancial intermediaries of international bonds are typically limited by regulations on currency
mismatches. In Latin America (and several Asian countries) the private sector is typically
a net debtor in international capital markets and a net lender to its own government.






To distinguishproducer and worker/saver choices of production inputs, uppercaseisusedfor
the former and lower case for the latter. The hiring of labor takes place in a spot market and
capitalhastoberentedfromtheintermediary. Toensurethatitisreturnedtotheintermediary
after the closing of goods and factor markets, the producer must provide collateral. Because
of ﬁnancial market imperfections capital itself is insufﬁcient as collateral so that government
bonds must be used in addition. This gives rise to the following ﬁnancial constraint:
dt + mt ≥ γkt . (4)
The parameter γ is part of the economy’s intermediation technology, and reects two
distinct aspects. First, more severe moral hazard and more severe legal and enforcement
problems in the use of capital itself as collateral are associated with a larger γ. Second, the
effect of a larger share of capital owned outright is associated with a lower γ.
The timing of transactions in period 0 is as follows. At the beginning of the period
the sequence of government transfer spending {gt}
∞
t=0 is realized. Then the government






t=0. Next goods and factor markets
open, and the household splits into a shopper, a worker, a saver and a producer who
conduct independent transactions, all of which are on credit terms. The shopper purchases
consumption goods ct from producers. The worker supplies labor to the labor market, and
his real labor income (Wt/Pt)lt is subject to a proportional tax τt.T h e saver purchases
investment goods It from producers, subject to an adjustment cost. He also deposits
his existing capital stock kt with the intermediary against the promise of a return of the
(depreciated) capital stock after factor markets close, plus a competitive real return rd
t.T h e
producer receives the household’s entire current holdings of cash and bonds when the
household splits. This allows him to provide collateral to satisfy the ﬁnancial constraint
16and therefore to rent capital
18, and it gives him an incentive to return the capital when
factor markets close. The intermediary receives the competitive marginal product of capital
rk
t. After goods and factor markets close, the shopper, worker, saver and producer reunite
and a centralized securities market opens between the government and households. Here
households settle all claims from the previous goods and factor markets transactions, they
receivegovernmenttransfers, paytheirtaxes, andacquire(orsell)nominalmoneyMt+1−Mt






= dt + mt − mt+1(1 + πt+1)+wtlt(1 − τt)+r
d
tkt












t − wtLt − r
k
tKt (5)
Let the multiplier of the budget constraint (5) be given by λt, the multiplier of the capital
accumulation identity (2) by λtqt (where qt is the shadow price of installed capital), and the
multiplier of the ﬁnancial constraint (4) by µt. Then the following ﬁrst order conditions for
























= λt , (8)
18 As these assets relax the producer’s ﬁnancial constraint, they are more valuable to him
than to the rest of the household. It is therefore optimal to endow him with the entire stock
of household ﬁnancial assets while goods and factor markets are open.
17κ
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dt + mt ≥ γkt ,µ t ≥ 0 ,µ t(dt + mt − γkt)=0. (13)
The optimality conditions for investment (6) and for the saver’s capital accumulation (7)
arestandard. Conditions (9)forleisure and(8)forconsumptionyieldthe followingcondition





= wt(1 − τt) . (14)
On this margin a higher tax rate therefore creates a larger distortion.
Producers set the marginal product of labor equal to the real wage in accordance with
(10). But from (11), when the ﬁnancial constraint (4) binds so that µt > 0,t h em a r g i n a l
product of capital exceeds the return rk
t paid out to the intermediary. The reason is that in
order to rent capital producers need to also hold government bonds, which by (12) have a
lower ﬁnancial return when µt > 0. The requirement to hold low­yield collateral makes it
costlier to rent capital, so that ﬁrms reduce their capital stock. Any relaxation of the ﬁnancial
constraint requires a higher tax rate that can ﬁscally sustain a higher debt stock. A higher tax
rate therefore reduces distortions on this margin. This effect goes in the opposite direction to
the labor supply effect. It is the tension between these two effects which creates the policy
trade­off discussed in Section 2 (Figure 3).
18The optimality conditions for money and bonds can be combined to obtain a familiar­















Together with the assumption about a satiation point for real money balances this establishes
the optimality of the Friedman rule, i
g
t+1 =0 ∀t ≥ 0. This implies, from the Fisher equation,
that a lower real ﬁnancial return on government debt r
g
t+1 calls for a higher ination rate.
A higher tax rate relaxes the ﬁnancial constraint and thereby raises the ﬁnancial return on
bonds, up to the point where the ﬁnancial constraint ceases to bind. Therefore, up to that
point, a higher tax rate lowers ination.
3.2 Intermediary
The intermediary is owned by households. It is competitive in the markets for savings and
for productive capital, and its services are only required while goods and factor markets are
open. During this period the intermediary accepts deposits of kt from savers at the interest
rate rd
t and lends Kt to producers at the interest rate rk
t. For simplicity the intermediary’s net
w o r t hi sa s s u m e dt ob ez e r o ,s ot h a ti tr e l i e se n t i r e l yo n1 0 0 %l o a nc o l l a t e r a l i z a t i o nt oe n s u r e
its solvency, resulting in the ﬁnancial constraint (4). The following balance sheet constraint
must hold:
kt = Kt . (16)






It is assumed that if the intermediary defaults on his obligation to repay the deposit, the
saver has a claim to the intermediary’s collateral assets in an amount equal to his deposit.
193.3 Government





= dt + gt − τtwtlt , (18)
and its lifetime budget constraint is therefore











(τtwtlt − gt) . (19)
The process for lump­sum transfers {gt}
∞
t=0 is exogenous. A government policy G is






t=0 plus an optimal tax rate τopt. The government chooses
its policy instruments to maximize households’ lifetime utility, subject to its own lifetime
budget constraint, agents’ optimality conditions, economy­wide resource constraints and
further restrictions on the permissible set of taxes. The government is assumed to have
access to a technology that allows it to credibly commit to the announced policies.
3.4 Equilibrium
An allocation is deﬁned as a set of sequences {ct,l t,L t,I t,k t,K t,D t,M t}
∞
t=0,a n daprice
system as a set of sequences
©






t=0 Then a competitive equilibrium is
deﬁned as follows:
A competitive equilibrium given k−1, D−1 and M−1 is an allocation, a price system and
a government policy (including exogenous government spending) such that
(a) given the price system and the government policy, the allocation solves the
household’s problem of maximizing (1) subject to (2), (5) and (4),
(b) the price system and allocation satisfy the intermediary’s balance sheet identity (16)
a n dz e r op r o ﬁt condition (17),
(c) the labor market clears at all times
lt = Lt ∀t, (20)
20(d) the goods market clears at all times












The government chooses a policy G at time 0, and households subsequently choose
their allocations. In choosing optimal policies the government needs to predict how
household allocations and prices will respo n dt oi t sp o l i c i e s ,t a k i n gi n t oa c c o u n tt h e
objective function (1) and the constraints (2), (5) and (4). An allocation rule is
deﬁned as a sequence of functions A(G)={ct,l t,L t,I t,k t,K t,D t,M t | G}
∞
t=0 that maps
policies G into allocations, and a pricing rule is deﬁned as a sequence of functions
P(G)=
©






t=0 that maps policies G into prices. Then the Ramsey
equilibrium is deﬁned as follows:
A Ramsey equilibrium given k−1, D−1 and M−1 is a government policy G, an allocation
rule A(.), and a pricing rule P(.) such that
(a) the government policy G maximizes household utility (1) subject to the government’s
lifetime budget constraint (19), with allocations and prices given by A(G) and P(G),
(b) for every government policy ˜ G, the allocation A( ˜ G) and the price system P( ˜ G)
together with the government policy ˜ G are a competitive equilibrium.
4 Optimal Fiscal Crisis Resolution
This section discusses the optimal policy response to increases in ﬁscal transfer
spending, speciﬁcally theoptimalmix betweenhigher distortionarylabortaxationand higher
distortionary ination. For the following computational exercises parameter values are
assigned according to Table 2. The parameter values are standard in the literature
19 except for
the collateral coverage ratioγ =0 .25, which does not have a reference value in the literature.
19 The share of leisure in utility κ is calibrated as the value consistent with the absence of a
collateralconstraintanda labor taxrate of20%. Asteadystate proportionof time spentworkingof onethird
is assumed, as suggested by Kydland (1995) and the evidence cited there. As is common
in this model class, the implied κ approximately equals two thirds.
21Initial steady state government transfer spending is set to g =0 .10, which corresponds to
around 9% of GDP.
Table 2: Parameter Values
Description Symbol Value
Labor Share in Production α 0.64
Capital Stock Adjustment Cost θ 1
Depreciation Rate δ 0.025
Rate of Time Preference p.a. r 0.08
Collateral Coverage γ 0.25
4.1 Steady States
Figure 4 displays the steady state values of key variables for different settings of ﬁscal
policy and given the Friedman rule. The tax rate τ is varied along the horizontal axis.
20 The
idea is to determine the steady state debt and therefore capital stocks that can be sustained
by a given tax rate, and the implied values of all other variables. These results are used as an
input into Section 4.2, which discusses transitions between su c hs t e a d ys t a t e s .
Figure 4 shows that as the tax rate is raised from relatively low levels, the stock of
government debt that can be ﬁscally supported rises, and therefore so does the amount
of intermediation and of physical capital. This corresponds to the outward shift of the
production possibilities frontier in Figure 3. At the same time a higher tax rate distorts
and reduces labor supply. At relatively low tax rates the ﬁrst effect dominates and steady
state output increases with the tax rate despite the reduction in labor input. Over this range
of taxes welfare increases in the tax rate, as both consumption and leisure increase. All of
the panels in Figure 4 have a kink and welfare maximum at a tax rate of 19.19%.
21 This is the
p o i n ta tw h i c ht h eﬁnancial constraint ceases to bind so that the only effect of higher taxes is
to increase the labor supply distortion. It will be shown that this tax rate is not optimal in a
dynamic setting because it is not time consistent.
20 A separately available Technical Appendix contains details on the method used to compute
both steady state and dynamic Ramsey equilibria.
21 The vertical lines in the graphs are inserted at this tax rate.
22Al o wt a xr a t ea n dal o ws t o c ko fg o v e r n ment debt implies a high value of the ﬁnancial
constraint multiplier and therefore a low real ﬁnancial return on government debt. As
producers need to hold this asset to obtain access to credit, they maintain a sufﬁciently low
capital stock for the higher marginal product of capital to compensate them for the lower
bond return. At the kink the ﬁnancial constraint multiplier is zero, and returns on both


























































































4.2 Optimal Response to a Fiscal Shock
Methodology and Preliminary Results
The computation of optimal transition paths in response to changes in g is complicated
by the fact that the Ramsey problem is not recursive. Optimal choices at time 0 depend on
control variables many periods into the future, due to the constraint imposed by government
intertemporal solvency combined with the inability of agents to insure themselves against
government spending shocks. Aiyagari et al. (2002) discuss this matter in detail for an
economy without capital. Capital accumulation under adjustment costs makes this even
harder. The separate Technical Appendix shows how this problem can be solved for a
23perfect foresight setting by using a computable general equilibrium technique. The idea
is to solve the entire nonlinear system of optimality conditions and resource constraints
simultaneously for a large number of periods, including the government’s lifetime budget
constraint. The inﬁnite dimensionality of that problem is reduced by imposing and then
verifying convergence of the system to a new steady state within a ﬁnite number of periods.
This solves for the solution paths of all variables, including their new steady state values. In
the examples below convergence obtains within 80 periods.
A key question concerns the fractions of the increase in spending that are optimally
ﬁnanced by taxation and ination. The former is computed from the optimal solution paths
by evaluating the increase in the present discounted value of spending and of tax revenue
using the pre­shock real interest rate for discounting, and expressing the latter as a fraction
of the former. The remainder is accounted for by higher ination and therefore lower real
interest rates, which increases the present discounted value of future primary surpluses.
The appendix shows three preliminary results for model variants that ignore the two key
constraints imposed in this paper, the ﬁnancial constraint and the constraint on the time
proﬁle of labor tax rates. In all cases government spending is held constant at g =0 .1.
First, without either constraint it is optimal to inate away all debt in the initial period and
therebytoreducedistortionarytaxesbythemaximumpossible, to13.88%. TheLucas(1987)
welfare gain of doing so is a 0.65% compensating consumption variation. Second, with a
ﬁnancial constraint but still allowing for arbitrary paths for the labor tax rate, the long­run
optimal tax rate corresponds to the kink at 19.19% in Figure 4 where the constraint ceases
to bind. This is a version of the zero long run taxation of capital (via the ination tax on
debt) result. Third, with a ﬁnancial constraint the government’s incentive to inate away all
of its debt disappears. But it can still realize a welfare gain of 0.28% by reducing the tax
rate very drastically at time 0 (actually, subsidizing labor at around 10%) and then letting it
return to its initial value. Fiscally, the temporary loss of labor tax revenue is compensated by
a temporary surge in ination. The model as it stands does account for the (small) beneﬁts
24of such a policy, but it does not account for the large political and resource costs discussed in
the Introduction. The analysis proceeds under the additional assumption that for any given
sequence of spending {gt}
∞
t=0 the government can choose only one constant tax rate τopt.
Figure 5 demonstrates that for the complete model with both constraints there is,
for a given spending sequence {gt}
∞
t=0, one constant tax rate at which there is no time
inconsistency problem. The dotted line in both plots represents steady state welfare at
different tax rates, taken from Figure 4. The experiment behind the solid line in the left
hand side plot is as follows: Fix the initial debt and capital stocks at the values consistent
with a tax rate of 19.19%. Then set the tax rate to a lower level, compute the transition
paths to the associated steady state, and evaluate welfare. The plot shows that welfare can be
raised by lowering tax rates and thereby reducing the debt and capital stocks. The maximum
w e l f a r eg a i ni sa c h i e v e db yas i g n i ﬁcant, 2.90% reduction in taxes to 16.29%. The second
plot conﬁrms that once debt and capital have reached the steady state values consistent with
that lower tax rate, welfare cannot be improved by either raising or lowering taxes. Note
that this result is intermediate between the welfare maximizing steady state with a ﬁnancial
constraint at 19.19% (Figure 4) and the optimal tax rate without a ﬁnancial constraint of
13.88% (Figure 8). At the 16.29% optimal tax rate steady state labor is taxed less than at the
welfare maximizing steady state, but capital is taxed even in the long run. In other words,
both the labor supply distortion and the ination distortion are present at the optimum. The
associatedvaluesfordebtandcapitalarethenaturalstartingvaluesfortheanalysisofoptimal
responses to ﬁscal shocks in the following exercises.
22
22 To avoid terminological confusion the paper does not refer to these as “time consistent” or
“sustainable”steadystates, asthesetermshaveaspeciﬁcmeaningintheliteratureonreputationalequilibria.
The concepts are nevertheless similar in that in both cases there is no beneﬁtt os h o r t ­run
deviations from a long­run optimum.
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Figure 5
A Permanent Spending Increase
The new Ramsey tax rate for a permanent 5% increase in government transfer spending
is 16.90%. Figure 6a shows how this shares the ﬁscal burden of the higher spending level.
First, because of the binding ﬁnancial constraint and the given initial capital stock, the initial
price level does not jump at all to revalue the debt stock. Instead, the ﬁscal contribution of
price level changes comes entirely from higher ongoing ination and therefore a lower real
interest rate on government debt, in other words through increased seigniorage on debt. But
this only ﬁnances 24% of the increase in government spending, with 76% ﬁnanced through
higher labor taxes.
Figures 6b,c show the price and output responses to the higher tax rate. Labor supply
drops immediately, resulting ina ni n i t i a ld r o po ft h em a r g i n a l product of capital. But the
tighter ﬁnancial constraint and lower return on debt have a negative effect on intermediation
and thereby reduce the optimal capital stock over time. The ﬁnal steady state marginal
product of capital is therefore higher, thereby compensating borrowers for the lower return
on government bonds. As both labor and capital inputs are eventually reduced, output and
consumption also drop, by around 0.5%. Fiscal spending, even though it is a pure lump sum
transfer, is nonetheless contractionary because it forces the government to increase both the
tax and the ination distortions.
26Finally, it is interesting to note that for a permanent shock a government without access
to a commitment technology would, at least in the long­run, choose the exact same tax rate
as the Ramsey planner, by the logic of the argument underlying Figure 5.
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Figure 6a: Fiscal Variables
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A Temporary Spending Increase
Consider now a temporary (four year) 10% increase in transfer spending. It can be shown
that if the same spending increase was permanent the tax rate would optimally increase to
2717.51%. But as shown in Figure 7a, for the temporary case the tax rate only increases
by 0.12% to 16.41%. This limited tax response to much higher spending means that debt
issuance increases sharply relative to the capital stock, which in fact starts to decline. This
generates immediate ination that lowers the real ﬁnancing cost of the debt and thereby
helps to drive the real value of the debt stock down. The short­term ﬁscal burden is therefore
mostly borne by ination. But in the long run taxation still bears 59% of the overall burden
of adjustment, because a higher rate of taxation results in a healthier ﬁscal situation once
the high spending period ends. At that time it relaxes the ﬁnancial constraint and increases
the interest rate on debt, so that from that time on the ﬁnancing cost of the debt is in fact
higher than in the initial steady state. This pattern of taxation and ination is a very intuitive
outcome, aspolicymakersﬁnditpoliticallyfarlesscostlytouseinationtosatisfytemporary
revenue needs, rather than adjusting the labor tax rate. And importantly, despite the large
increase in spending the increase in ination is not excessive at around 2%. This is because
in this model the base of the ination tax is far larger than the stock of base money, it includes
a debt stock that equals around 50% of annual GDP.
As for the productive sector, higher ination in the transition temporarily depresses the
capital stock, and together with the drop in labor supply this leads to a signiﬁcant output
contraction. But eventually the higher tax rate shifts out the production possibilities frontier
via higher debt and capital stocks, and output recovers beyond its original level.
The most remarkable aspect of Figure 7 is that the intertemporal pattern of ination
is purely determined by ﬁscal factors. Of course this does depend on monetary
accommodation, but any such accommodation is an optimal response.
W h e nt h ee x e r c i s ei nF i g u r e7i sr e p e a t ed for a shorter, one year increase in g by 10%, all
qualitative features of the responses remain unchanged. But theoptimal tax rate nowchanges
only minimally (it increases by 0.01%), and 82% of the burden of ﬁscal adjustment falls on
ination. Essentially, the ﬁscal disturbance is so short­lived that the resulting temporary and
quite modest increase in ination does not do so much harm to intermediation as to justify a
28large and much harder to reverse change in the tax rate.
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Figure 7a: Fiscal Variables
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The conclusion from these computed examples is that the size of the optimal tax response
to a ﬁscal crisis depends not only on the size of the initial ﬁscal imbalance (in present value
terms) but also on its duration. For very short­lived ﬁscal shocks it is optimal to balance
the budget mostly through higher ination, essentially seigniorage on debt, while for very
long­lived shocks the burden of adjustment should mostly be on taxation.
295C o n c l u s i o n
The paper presents a model of ﬁs c a la n dm o n e t a r yp o l i c yt h a ta i m st os h e dn e wl i g h to n
the policy trade­offs involved in the resolution of ﬁscal crises. It makes two assumptions that
reect the constraints often faced by policymakers in such situations. First, policymakers
are very apprehensive of simply inating away the public debt. Data were shown to argue
that such a policy would be highly damaging to ﬁnancial intermediation. Constraints of this
nature, which are incorporated into the model as a ﬁnancial constraint linking the capital
stock to the debt stock, are frequently encountered in IMF ﬁscal program negotiations.
Second, frequent changes in taxation are much harder to implement than a one­time tax
adjustment combined with a time­varying ination tax on debt. The model therefore restricts
attention to Ramsey equilibria with constant labor tax rates.
The key contribution of the paper is the construction of a theoretical model in which
unanticipated ina t i o ni ss o c i a l l yc o s t l yb e c a u s eo fi t se f f e c to nt h er e a ld e b ts t o c ka n d
thereby on intermediation and production. Because a higher debt stock can only be
supported through higher distortionary taxation, higher distortionary taxation permits lower
distortionary ination. This makes price level determination the result of a meaningful
government optimization problem that trades off the costs of taxation and ination.
F u r t h e r m o r e ,t h ef a c tt h a td e b te n t e r st h ee c o n omy’s intermediation technology implies that
part of the debt return is non­ﬁnancial. In that case ination can be used to levy seigniorage
on debt. Because debt is generally much larger than base money, the ﬁscal leverage of
moderate ongoing ination increases dramatically.
The model therefore clearly articulates a channel through which ﬁscal policy alone drives
ination, and without reliance on the much less signiﬁcant seigniorage on base money.
Discussions of monetary policy for emerging markets acknowledge that ﬁscal dominance
remains a serious problem there, but typically this is not reected in the models used, where
ﬁscal policy most often consists of Ricardian lump­sum transfers. The main alternatives are
30the ﬁscal theory of the price level and the optimal ﬁscal policy literature. But the former,
apart from not being based on optimizing government behavior, does make the problematic
prediction that motivated the assumption of a ﬁnancial constraint, namely that serious ﬁscal
imbalances can be painlessly resolved through large price level jumps. This conclusion
is only slightly modiﬁed by the optimal ﬁscal policy literature, which has the additional
problem that it cannot easily rule out inﬁnite ﬁrst period ination. On a theoretical level,
neither theory exhibits ﬁscal dominance in the determination of average ination. And on
a practical level, neither theory can provide much guidance in thinking about the burden­
sharing between taxation and ination in the resolution of a ﬁscal crisis. This has been an
important objective of this paper, and it can claim some success.
Speciﬁcally, the computed examples suggest that permanent spending shocks should be
ﬁnanced mostly (around three quarters) through tax increases, while the contribution of
temporary increases in ination should increase as shocks become more short­lived.
This research can be expandedi n t os e v e r a li n t e r e s t i n gd irections. Work in progress
includes a real debt version of the paper that addresses the closely related question of optimal
outright default on real debt. Further ahead, it may be useful to insert this model into a
framework with either nominal rigidities or private sector learning about monetary policy
shocks. This would make monetary policy more interesting than in the current model, and
may permit an analysis of optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy rules under both monetary and
ﬁscal shocks. The advantage of the current model is of course that it exhibits the underlying
ﬁscal driving forces of ination much more clearly.
31Appendix Unconstrained Ramsey Plans
The following graphs showRamsey plansfor model variantsthat ignore one or bothof the
two key constraints imposed in this paper, the ﬁnancial constraint and the constraint on the
time proﬁle of labor tax rates. In all cases government spending is held constant at g =0 .1.
The dotted line represents an economy without either constraint. The solid line represents
an economy with a ﬁnancial constraint but without a constraint on the labor tax proﬁle.
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Figure 8b: Fiscal Variables
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